Introduction
Anxiety disorders are among the most common mental health conditions affecting individuals under the age of 18 years (herein referred to as youth), with recent pooled prevalence rates estimated to be 20.5% (Racine et al.,
2021) and lifetime prevalence rates estimated to be 32% by the time a child reaches the age of 18 years (Merikangas et al.,
2010). These disorders are associated with high rates of concurrent and future mental health disorders and, without effective treatment, tend to persist into adulthood (Pollard et al.,
2023). Furthermore, youth anxiety is associated with impaired outcomes across several domains, including physical health, self-harm, social relationships, education, healthcare, employment, and financial outcomes later in life, as well as high economic costs to society (Langley et al.,
2014; Pollard et al.,
2023). Thus, effective treatment is essential.
Fortunately, well-established psychosocial interventions for youth anxiety exist. To date, the determination of whether a treatment is considered effective largely has emphasized symptom reduction and improvements in functioning. There is limited empirical work investigating the harm or non-beneficence (herein referred to collectively as harm) within youth anxiety treatment, which represents a critical gap in the current literature (Jonsson et al.,
2014). As individuals who are engaged clinically and scientifically in the field of youth anxiety, we aimed to provide a commentary that integrates the current cognitive-behavioral theoretical understanding of youth anxiety and limited extant empirical data to discuss any documented or potentially harmful effects of psychosocial interventions for anxious youth. We considered using a systemic review approach, though given the minimal empirical research on harms in youth anxiety treatments, we believed a commentary that raises potential avenues for further work was more appropriate at this time. For example, one systematic review of harms in psychotherapy trials found that of 132 reviewed studies, only 28 systematically assessed harm, only one of which focused on childhood anxiety disorders (Jonsson et al.,
2014). Thus, we consider this review to be a forward-looking and theoretical commentary that we hope will motivate further efforts in this field, rather than a conclusive review of harms caused by treatments for youthwith anxiety disorders.
For our purposes, similar to recent work by McKay and colleagues (
2021), we define harm as
the exacerbation or prolonging of anxiety symptoms despite participation in psychosocial interventions for youth anxiety. Within this definition, we include consideration of both direct harm (i.e., treatment results in worse outcomes than would be anticipated in the absence of treatment, adverse events, etc.) and indirect harm (i.e., loss of resources, prolonged treatment, dampened motivation for future treatment, interference with participation in efficacious treatments, etc.) of psychosocial interventions (Lilienfeld,
2007). Our conceptualization of harm here is guided by cognitive-behavioral theory and our perspectives as clinicians and researchers who conceptualize
maladaptive anxious avoidance (i.e., the repeated and excessive avoidance of a feared stimuli that is not objectively dangerous) as a hallmark factor responsible for the maintenance of anxiety symptomatology (Baca et al.,
2023; Whiteside et al.,
2013). Thus, we include treatment effects that result in the perpetuation of maladaptive avoidance as potentially harmful.
We examine harm across three primary domains: harm associated with (1) individual treatments delivered by trained professionals, (2) self-help interventions, and (3) societal trends. The vast majority of identified harms were indirect, and thus the present commentary focuses on the indirect harms with a discussion of a few notable exceptions of direct harms.
Discussion
Several themes emerged across our commentary of how psychosocial interventions for youth anxiety have the potential for unintended consequences. First, even within CBT, the gold-standard treatment for youth anxiety, we believe the potential for harm exists. Our first primary source of harm is the inconsistency within the delivery of the intervention. There is considerable variability in the emphasis/inclusion of various components, with the most effective component (i.e., exposures) often underutilized and the least effective component (i.e., relaxation) frequently overutilized (Becker-Haimes et al.,
2017; Reid et al.,
2018). Youth engagement in CBT that results in either no change or a worsening of symptoms may be particularly harmful, as youth and families may lose hope after concluding that even the gold-standard treatment does not improve anxiety symptoms. The second primary source of harm is the limited availability of the most evidence-based treatment. Due to the relatively low number of CBT-trained clinicians who practice primarily in out-of-pocket, specialist settings, access to these services is quite limited (Reardon et al.,
2020). Even among those with access to CBT, the days, weeks, months, and even years spent on waitlists prolong youth anxiety symptoms and add considerable time to illness duration. Further, in the United States, these services are often unattainable as the majority of child anxiety specialists bill out-of-pocket due to the existing reimbursement infrastructure. Relatedly, we believe that the lack of access to CBT is, in part, to blame for the large proportion of anxious youth who end up participating in the many non-evidence-based treatments reviewed in this paper that have the potential to prolong anxiety. Both the inconsistency of CBT delivery and lack of access are identified problems currently being examined by researchers, advocates, mental health professionals, and policy-makers. Future research should continue to increase the efficiency and consistency of dissemination and implementation of exposure-based CBT. Successfully resolving these barriers will likely require a multi-pronged approach with collaboration between researchers, clinicians, policymakers, legislatures, and insurance companies.
Second, we believe that many available interventions delivered in healthcare, school, and family contexts adopt an avoidance-based orientation for managing youth anxiety. As a result, several self-care/coping strategies (e.g., journaling, meditating, listening to music), family responses, and school-based supports risk promoting emotional and/or behavioral avoidance rather than approach-oriented coping. As discussed throughout the article, avoidance is conceptualized by cognitive-behavioral theory as the primary factor that maintains anxiety; thus, promoting avoidance results in the maintenance and, often, worsening of youth anxiety. Future research is warranted to develop and test methods for disseminating information about the approach orientation for anxiety management and embedding approach-oriented coping across psychosocial interventions. For example, potential methods include partnering with and training key stakeholders, developing social media campaigns, and incorporating relevant training into continuing education seminars for clinicians and teachers.
Third, the wide variety of intervention options available to youth and families may not be beneficial. Throughout our review, we discussed multiple face-to-face therapy options, technology-based therapy programs, and self-help books, which ranged in their levels of effectiveness, research support, theoretical cogency, and potential for harm. Unfortunately, given caregivers’ lack of help-seeking knowledge (e.g., Reardon et al.,
2018; Reardon et al.,
2020), the multitude of available choices is likely to be overwhelming—
Which treatment do I choose? Which book should I read? Should I try this anxiety video game? Further, caregivers have the potential to unknowingly choose one of the available but ineffective options. Researchers and clinicians considering developing a novel treatment protocol, designing a new technology-based therapy program, or adding to the ever-growing self-help literature should thoughtfully consider whether the value added by this additional choice outweighs the increased decisional burden it places on caregivers. Further, policymakers are tasked with changing incentive structures to optimize the chances that evidence-based options are available to all families.
Fourth, our understanding is that there is a lack of empirical data on the harmful effects of psychosocial interventions. While much of the research has focused on demonstrating the efficacy of therapeutic interventions compared to placebo, waitlist, and psychotherapeutic control conditions, few have tested the harmful impacts of psychosocial interventions on youth anxiety. This is a fruitful area of potential research, as there is much to be learned. The arguments made throughout this paper for potential harm in these interventions were primarily theoretical and indirect (e.g., delaying access to treatment or prolonging anxiety). Potential questions include: How does the length and severity of illness differ among youth who receive effective versus ineffective treatment? What are the differences in current and prospective outcomes between youth who received CBT with exposures versus those without exposures? How does school performance compare among youth who received approach-oriented versus avoidance-oriented school-based supports? In addition to opportunities for increased beneficence and non-maleficence that the knowledge from these studies could offer, the existence of an empirical body of literature investigating harm in youth anxiety treatments would allow future researchers the ability to aggregate the information in a systematic review and/or meta-analysis.
It is important to acknowledge that several limitations exist within the present commentary. First, we did not utilize a systematic review methodology (e.g., systematic review and/or meta-analysis) of the literature given how rarely empirical research investigates harm within youth anxiety treatment. Because of this, any arguments or implications we drew from this commentary are based on our intrinsically biased knowledge of the evidence base and theoretical lens. It is possible that there are many relevant studies we neglected that could undermine our arguments. We hope that the points raised in this paper will stimulate more systematic research and advocacy that ultimately seeks to minimize harms for youth with anxiety disorders, but it should not be used to make definitive or conclusive arguments about harms in childhood anxiety disorder treatment.
Second, we chose to adopt a relatively narrow scope regarding our specific definition of harm, which is consistent with the medical model (i.e., the prolonging or exacerbation of anxiety symptoms). Regarding our chosen definition of harm, it is critical to acknowledge that other important forms of harm exist that warrant future consideration. First, psychosocial interventions may cause unique forms of harm to anxious BIPOC youth (e.g., cultural oppression; Sue,
2015). This may be especially relevant given the structural racism that afflicts healthcare, the deeply rooted implicit biases, and the fact that most research samples are comprised of white, Euro-American youth. Although the few studies that have investigated this question have not consistently found an effect of race or ethnicity on treatment outcomes, BIPOC youth are highly underrepresented in most of these samples, and thus there is unlikely to be sufficient statistical power to detect potential effects (Norris & Kendall,
2021). Second, psychosocial interventions may cause harm to minoritized populations (outside of the patient) if the interventions reinforce stereotypes and negative stigma (e.g., Pinciotti et al.,
2022). Third, psychosocial interventions may have harmful public health implications, such as extended time away from school (or work for caregivers), lost productivity, and high costs associated with care.
Third, given that we chose not to complete a systematic review due to the limited extant literature investigating harm within youth anxiety treatment, we chose to restrict youth anxiety treatments to select psychosocial interventions that are most common and salient in our research and clinical practice. Thus, this approach introduces bias, given that it is based on our own experiences and opinions. Additionally, several proposed psychosocial interventions (e.g., equine-assisted therapy) that warrant future review were excluded from this commentary. Further, while our focus was on psychosocial interventions, subsequent future work should also review harm within non-psychosocial treatments for youth anxiety, including psychopharmacological interventions, medical marijuana, nutritional and supplemental treatments, and non-invasive brain stimulation techniques (e.g., transcranial magnetic stimulation).
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