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According to the ABC model of positive feelings, responding to positive activating events with irrational beliefs will result in dysfunctional positive feelings. Evidencing the role of irrational beliefs in dysfunctional positive feelings may have important clinical implications. However, no study has tested this model. Here, we tested the ABC model of positive feelings based on the REBT model of emotion. 115 participants had to imagine eight anticipatory positive situations. Then they reported how vividly they imagined the situations, and what they would believe and feel if they were in each situation. After that, they completed a hypomania scale, a general measure of positive irrational beliefs, and a general measure of irrational beliefs about adverse events. Results showed that situational positive primary irrational beliefs mediate the effect of vividness of imagining positive situations on dysfunctional positive feelings (b = 2.436, 95% CI: LL = 1.314 to UL = 3.832) while situational preferences mediated the effect of positive events on functional positive feelings (b = 0.642, 95% CI: LL = 0.165 to UL = 1.209). Moreover, the effect of positive primary irrational beliefs on dysfunctional positive feelings was mediated by secondary positive irrational beliefs such as positive intolerance (b = 3.826, 95% CI: LL = 0. 370; to UL = 7.740), and extreme self-valuing (b = 1. 330, 95% CI: LL = 0.287 to UL = 2.471) but not by wonderfulizing (b = 0.061, 95% CI: LL = −3.337 to UL = 3.298). Finding support for the ABC model of positive feelings and showing the role of irrational beliefs in dysfunctional and functional positive feelings may advance existing treatments for promoting mental health and reducing the disturbances of positive emotions.
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Introduction
In 1957, Albert Ellis advanced the ABC cognitive model of distress (Ellis, 1957). According to the ABC model of distress, when people react to negative events with flexible and moderate thinking in the form of flexible appraisals named rational beliefs, they experience functional negative feelings (e.g., worry, sadness, annoyance, and regret). Instead, when people react to negative events (e.g., “I failed my exam”) by developing their thinking into rigid (e.g., “I must not fail my exam”) and extreme (e.g., “Failing my exam is awful and unbearable, and because I did fail, I am useless”) appraisals named irrational beliefs, they experience dysfunctional negative feelings (e.g., anxiety, depression, anger, guilt) (Ellis, 1994). Furthermore, Ellis (1994) proposed a specific relationship between different types of irrational beliefs and distress. Ellis (), identified two types of irrational beliefs: (1) primary irrational beliefs, and (2) secondary irrational beliefs. Primary irrational appraisals (i.e., demandingness) are rigid appraisals in the form of beliefs that situations should be as someone wants them to be (e.g., “When I want to succeed at something, it is a must”). Secondary appraisals are extreme appraisals in the form of beliefs that activating situations are 100% bad (e.g., awfulizing), that someone cannot stand the activating situation (e.g., frustration intolerance), or that they, their lives, or the world are bad (e.g., self, others, or life depreciation). According to Ellis (1994), primary irrational beliefs determine secondary irrational beliefs, which in turn determine dysfunctional feelings. This proposal has been supported by research showing that the effect of demandingness on distress is mediated by secondary irrational beliefs (catastrophizing, frustration intolerance, and depreciation beliefs) (DiLorenzo et al., 2007).
Ellis suggested a similar cognitive model for positive events. Individuals who react to positive events (e.g., “I got an A on an important exam”) with rigid (e.g., “I should take this exam”) and extreme (e.g., taking an A is wonderful and so good that I cannot stand the happiness, getting an A makes me a very valuable person) positive appraisals or irrational beliefs, experience dysfunctional positive feelings (DPF; for instance, elation, euphoria, exaltation) (David & Cramer, 2010; David et al., 2004; Ellis, 1994). Instead, individuals who react to positive events with flexible and moderate positive thinking in the form of rational beliefs, experience functional positive feelings (FPF; for instance, happiness, gladness, contentment).
As far as we know, there has been no empirical testing of the Ellis' positive ABC model. Current models of psychopathology identify rational and irrational beliefs as major factors in mental disorders (David et al., 2018; Trip et al., 2010; Vîslã et al., 2016). Moreover, reducing rigid and extreme negative thinking and promoting rational thinking seem to be required for ensuring well-being and happiness (Oltean et al., 2017; Turner, 2016). However, little is known about the role of irrational beliefs in DPF. The study of the role of irrational positive beliefs in functional and dysfunctional positive emotions may expand both the current model of the role of irrational beliefs in mental health and the model of positive emotional disturbances by revealing new mechanisms that contribute to positive emotional disturbances.
Previous research found that positive primary irrational beliefs (demandingness) contribute to the trait-like risk of hypomania (Tiba et al., 2023) and are positively related to DPF (Tiba & Szentagotai, 2005). To our knowledge, no study has looked into the role of positive irrational beliefs as mediators between positive events and positive dysfunctional feelings. According to early proposals (Ellis, 1994), positive irrational beliefs mediate the relationship between positive events and DPF. Thus, the main contribution of positive irrational beliefs would be the causation of DPF or positive emotion disturbance in response to positive events (Gruber et al., 2008).
Dysfunctional Positive Feelings
When individuals encounter activating events that are relevant to their goals, they respond with feelings. According to the REBT model of emotion, feelings are multicomponent responses involving subjective, cognitive, physiological, and behavioral changes in response to activating events (Ellis et al., 2010). When the activating events are negative, individuals experience negative feelings. When activating events are positive, individuals experience positive events.
We can divide negative and positive feelings into two categories: (1) functional feelings, which have adaptative consequences such as sadness, annoyance, fear for negative feelings or happiness, gladness, contentment for positive feelings, and (2) dysfunctional feelings, which have maladaptive consequences such as depression, anger, anxiety for negative feelings or elation, exaltation, euphoria for positive feelings (Ellis, 1994).
The REBT literature proposes both high intensity and qualitative characteristics to distinguish between dysfunctional and functional feelings in the REBT theory (David et al., 2004; Ellis & DiGiuseppe, 1993). Thus, in the case of negative feelings, dysfunctional feelings are characterized by high intensity, long duration, and dysfunctional biological, behavioral, and cognitive components (David et al., 2014). Although we can follow the same logic for the REBT model of DPF, little research has investigated DPF based on an REBT model of affect (Tiba & Szentagotai, 2005).
According to affective science models of positive emotions (Gruber et al., 2019), the most common descriptions suggest that dysfunctional positive emotions are intense and persistent positive emotional states such as elation or euphoria, which resemble affective states during hypomania (Gruber, 2011). Usually, DPF or positive emotion disturbances are described in the context of hypomania, bipolar disorder, or other DSM-5 disorders (Gruber et al., 2019). Looking closer, both affective science (Gruber et al., 2008) and REBT literature (David et al., 2004, 2005) suggest three major models: (1) the quantitative model, which considers that DPF are very intense positive feelings (too much positive emotion) (Gruber et al., 2008); (2) the qualitative model, which suggests that functional and dysfunctional feelings differ rather qualitatively in the cognitive, behavioral, and biological components; and (3) the mixed models, which assume that functional and DPF differ both in quantity (intensity and persistence) and quality (David et al., 2004, 2005). Given the fact that most studies converge on the idea that positive emotion disturbance involves intense positive emotions (Gruber et al., 2008), and a least a qualitative dimension, most of the models are mixed models. Depending on their focus, mixed models point to the fact that, in addition to being intense, dysfunctional positive emotions are characterized by high persistence across contexts (Gruber, 2011), emotional dysregulation (Giovanelli et al., 2013), or emotional reactivity (Henry et al., 2012). Each of these models may propose a particular dysfunctional aspect of positive emotion disturbance that may preferentially rely on a different underlying mechanism.
Previous studies that used an REBT model of emotion suggest a specific type of context inappropriateness (approach/consummatory imbalance model) of dysfunctional positive emotions that may be driven by high levels of positive irrational beliefs (Tiba & Szentagotai, 2005). Tiba and Szentagotai (2005) found that individuals with high levels of irrational beliefs have higher levels of consummatory positive emotions in response to remembering approach-related positive events and higher levels of approach-related positive emotions when remembering consummatory events. These results are in line with what other research has found: DPF are very strong positive feelings that happen when the appetitive/approach system is overactive, and the approach/consumatory states are out of balance. Thus, when the approach system is overactivated, individuals (1) experience consummatory emotional states (happiness and satisfaction) when approaching rewards, and (2) experience approach-related emotional states when they are in the consummatory phase (Tiba & Szentagotai, 2005). Rigid expectations of attaining goals and desires (primary irrational beliefs) were suggested as the main factors that may set a sensitive approach system in overdrive in response to incentive cues (Tiba, 2010; Tiba & Manea, 2018). Although it may be the case that this approach/consummatory imbalance is a more general type of context inappropriateness based on an overdrive state of the approach system and not exclusively related to irrational beliefs, it suggests that irrational beliefs may play an important role in dysfunctional positive emotions.
Cognition and Dysfunctional Positive Feelings
Aaron T. Beck suggested that positive cognitive distortions are the positive opposite of negative cognitive distortions (Leahy & Beck, 1988). As a result, he proposed that positive cognitive distortions are cognitive factors that may maintain positive mood (jumping to positive conclusions, positive magnification, and positive self-evaluations). Although there are many types of positive cognitions associated with psychopathology (Leahy & Beck, 1988), two have received increasing empirical support. The first type of cognitive process is positive over-generalizations or expectancies for future success after attaining desired events (Eisner et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2005; Stern & Berrenberg, 1979). The second type of cognitive process is positive ruminations, or repeated self-focused positive thoughts (about attainment and personal goals) in response to positive mood (Feldman et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2008). Lately, substantiated research has shown a link between high levels of behavioral activation (Johnson & Carver, 2006) and persistent and tenacious goal pursuit as factors linked to personality risk for bipolar disorders (Dempsey et al., 2020). Recently, general primary irrational beliefs (demandingness) or rigid appraisals of goals (Ellis & Dryden, 1997) characterized by updating inflexibility and persistence (Tiba & Manea, 2018) have been linked to dysfunctional positive emotions (Tiba et al., 2023). However, there is currently a lack of data on the role of irrational beliefs in determining dysfunctional positive emotions when individuals encounter positive situations.
The Present Study
In the present study, we tested the ABC model of positive feelings based on the REBT model of functional and dysfunctional feelings by examining (1) the role of irrational and rational positive beliefs in mediating the effect of positive events on DPF, (2) the role of irrational and rational positive beliefs in mediating the effect of positive events on FPF, and (3) the role of secondary positive irrational beliefs in mediating the effect of primary positive irrational beliefs on DPF.
We further explored the relationships between functional feelings, dysfunctional feelings, and hypomanic mood. Like in our previous work (Tiba et al., 2023), we used a strategy proposed by Leahy and Beck (1988) to develop positive cognition by mirroring the image of negative cognition. Unlike our previous research, in this study we tested specific appraisals in eight positive anticipatory situations. Thus, we derived a situation-specific positive counterpart for each type of negative appraisal (demandingness, awfulizing, low frustration tolerance, and self-depreciation). Irrational beliefs items in negative situations were reformulated as positive appraisals in response to positive events. We derived wonderfulizing (“In this situation, I think it is wonderful, not just good, that this thing will happen”), positive intolerance (“In this situation, I believe that I can't bear being so happy that this thing happens"), and extreme self-valuing (“In this situation, I think I am a special person”/ “I am much better than others”). Demandingness referred to the imagined positive event, so it was formulated in a neutral but situation-specific form (“In this situation, I believe that this thing must happen and there is no other possible way”; “In this situation, I need this thing to happen''). We developed an additional item for preferential appraisal (i.e., " I believe this situation is just something I want very much, but it is not necessary to happen”). In the study of Tiba et al. (2023), secondary appraisals of self-valuing (e.g., “If I succeed, I will have more value as a person”) were positively related to general rational items and were not related to irrational items. So, in this study, we introduced a more extreme form of self-valuing, such as “I am special” and “I am much better than others." Also, we introduced a positive generalization item: “In this situation, I believe I will succeed in all other things” (Eisner et al., 2008).
According to the ABC cognitive model of emotion based on REBT theory (David et al., 2004; Ellis, 1994), we expected that both rational and irrational belief levels would mediate the relationship between the vividness of positive events and DPF. Furthermore, we expected that rational beliefs, but not irrational beliefs, would mediate the effect of positive events on FPF. We also expected that the effect of primary irrational beliefs on dysfunctional feelings would be mediated by secondary positive appraisals (Ellis, 1994). The vividness of imagining positive anticipatory events is a valid index for measuring positive events and their relationship with positive mood and hypo/mania (Vannucci et al., 2022). Moreover, using a rating of the vividness of positive events rather than a rating of the positivity of the events will help to avoid the confounding of positive ratings of events and of affect that may appear due to the close temporal succession of rating positive events and positive emotions. Thus, the participants first imagined, then rated their appraisals of the imagined situations, and then they endorsed the level of their feelings. We also explored the relationship between ratings of hypomanic mood and DPF.
Method
Participants
116 students from the University of Oradea were recruited for this study. One participant was dropped because he provided only multiple answers to the same question. Our final sample included 115 participants (102 women and 13 men). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 61 years (M = 24.56, SD = 9.47). The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association [WMA], 2013) and was approved by the ethical committee of the Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences of the University of Oradea (approval no 2872/18.05.2023).
Measures
Hypo/mania Symptoms The Altman Self-Rating Scale for Mania (ASRM; Altman et al., 1997) measures the experience of hypo/manic symptoms over the past week. Participants rate their responses on a Likert scale from 1 (e.g., “I do not feel happier or more cheerful than usual”) to 5 (“I feel happier or more cheerful than usual all the time”) (the internal consistency coefficient alpha Cronbach was acceptable 0.61).
Positive Emotions. We used 10 positive emotion adjectives to measure positive emotions. Participants had to indicate how much they disagreed with each item on a Likert type scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Very much). We calculated a FPF subscale containing six items of positive emotions related adjectives (delighted, happy, glad, joyful, cheerful, and pleased; the internal consistency coefficient alpha Cronbach was excellent 0.95) and DPF subscale containing four adjectives (euphoric, ecstatic, exalted, accelerated; the internal consistency coefficient alpha Cronbach was excellent 0.98).
Situational Positive Irrational Beliefs We used seven items to measure specific positive irrational and rational beliefs. Participants endorse on a 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Very much) Likert type scale for each positive situation how much they believe that: (1) “This situation must happen”; (2) “I need this situation to happen” (primary irrational beliefs); (3) “It is wonderful if this situation happens” (wonderfulizing); (3) “If this happens, I'll be so happy I can't stand it” (positive intolerance); (4) “I believe I am a special person if this situation happens”; and (5) “I believe I am much better than others if this situation happens” (extreme self-valuing); (6) “I want this situation to happen, but I realize that it must not happen just because I want it to happen” (positive primary rational beliefs); (7) “I believe I will succeed in all other things important to me if this situation happens” (positive overgeneralization). The internal consistency coefficient, alpha Cronbach, was excellent (0.97).
Positive Irrational Beliefs Scale. The Positive Irrational Beliefs Scale (Tiba et al., 2023) contains 23 items measuring positive irrational beliefs. Participants responded on a Likert type scale indicating whether they (1) totally disagreed with or (5) totally agreed with items referring to positive irrational beliefs. We calculated several scores: (1) general positive irrationality (all items), (2) general positive demandingness (two items, i.e., “When I see that important others may appreciate me, their appreciation becomes a must that I must have”), (3) demandingness in positive context (i.e., “I must obtain important things”), (4) general positive irrational beliefs (four items, “When I am about to succeed, succeeding is a must for me and is wonderful and I almost cannot stand the happiness”), and (5) general positive intolerance (three items, “When I succeed at something, I almost can’t bear the happiness"). The internal consistency coefficient alpha Cronbach was excellent 0.94.
Attitude and Beliefs Scale-Short Form. The Attitude and Beliefs Scale-Short Form (ABS-SF; DiGiuseppe et al., 2021) is a scale that measures general irrational beliefs about adverse events. Participants responded on Likert scales indicating whether they (1) totally disagreed with or (5) totally agreed with items referring to irrational beliefs. As recommended by the authors, we calculated a (1) rational subscale score and (2) an irrational subscale score. We also calculated a demandingness in negative context score to further analyze differences in assessing irrational processes towards adverse events. The internal consistency coefficient, alpha Cronbach was acceptable 0.69.
Procedure
Data collection was conducted online. An online link with an invitation to study was posted on university social media groups. After accessing the link, participants read the study description and the informed consent form. Participants who gave their consent responded to demographic questions. Then a series of eight positive anticipatory situations were presented (See supplementary material).
Participants had to vividly imagine eight approach-related positive events (e.g., learning it is possible to get a large amount of money/succeed) happening to them. After each situation, they rated the vividness of the imagined situation, ratings for positive appraisals, and emotional states. Ratings of the negative feelings were included in a different analysis. Self-rated Likert scales for positive emotions and arousal adjectives were used to measure positive feelings (Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2006). The emotional and arousal adjectives were selected based on an exploratory factorial analysis of previous data on the endorsement of positive emotion adjectives. DPF included high arousal positive emotions (euphoric, ecstatic, exalted, accelerated) while FPF included low arousal positive emotions (delighted, glad, happy, joyful, cheerful, and pleased). Using these items was consistent with those proposed by Hammond et al. (2022) whose findings point to an Active-Elated facet of hypomanic states with elation and energization as loading hypomanic-like state affect (Hammond et al., 2022).
After the imagery phase, participants completed the Altman Self-Rating Scale for Mania (Altman et al., 1997), a positive irrational beliefs scale (Tiba et al., 2023) and ABS short form (DiGiuseppe et al., 2021). Participants provide two additional ratings after each situation, a control rating (feeling neutral) and a rating of negative affect. These ratings were not included in the analyses for the present study.
Data Analysis
For personally endorsed valence scores, an expectation–maximization algorithm to handle the missing data was used. Chi-square tests for differences in demographic characteristics and frequency variables between groups were used. The outliers for correlation and regression analyses were removed based on SPSS statistics. One score for each positive irrational process was computed. Also, a total score and a measure of general positive irrational beliefs were computed.
To find the optimal model, exploratory factor analyses of the positive irrational scale and DPF scale were conducted using SPSS version 23 (IBM, 2015). Principal axis factoring (PAF) with direct oblimin rotation (Δ 0.4) and Kaiser normalization was used for factor extraction when analyzing functional and DPF in response to specific situations. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of normality suggested normal distributions (all ps > 0.01) for positive primary rational beliefs, extreme self-valuing, general irrational beliefs, general rational beliefs, generalization, and general positive irrational beliefs. The visual inspection of the P-P plot and scatterplot suggested a normal distribution of residuals and that the data meet the homoscedasticity assumption for mediation. A power analysis using Monte Carlo Simulation for both simple mediation and parallel mediation based on correlation coefficients and standard deviation suggests that a sample size of 115 provided adequate power for mediation analyses (Schoemann et al., 2017).
Results
Descriptive statistics
The means and standard deviations for the main variables in the study are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Sample characteristics
Sample characteristics
Descriptive statistics
Age in years, mean (SD, range)
24.65 (± 9.47, 18–61)
Gender identity, n/N (%)
Female
102 / 115 (88.69%)
Male
13 / 115 (11.30%)
Vividness of imagery for positive situations
6.48 (± 1.90, 2.25–9, n = 115)
Irrationality in adverse situations scores (ABS-SF) (SD, range, n)
Irrationality subscale (G-IB)
19.41 (± 9.62, 1–44, n = 115)
Rationality subscale (G-RB)
33.38 (± 8.77, 8–64.21, n = 115)
General positive irrationality scores (SD, range, n)
Dysfunctional positive emotions mean (SD, range, n)
47.84 (± 16.51, 8.75–72, n = 115)
ASRM, mean (SD, range, n)
10.58 (± 3.44, 5–23, n = 115)
G-PIB General positive irrational beliefs, G-IB General irrational beliefs, G-RB General rational beliefs
The Correlations Between Irrational Beliefs and Functional and Dysfunctional Positive Feelings
Table 2 summarizes the Spearman correlation coefficients between general irrational beliefs about adverse events, general irrational beliefs about positive events, situational variables, and functional and dysfunctional positive feelings.
Table 2
Correlations Coefficients between the Study Variables
S. No.
N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1
DPF
115
1
–
2
FPF
115
0.654**
1
–
3
ASMR
115
0.066
0.080
1
–
4
VIPE
115
0.438**
0.515**
0.089
1
–
5
PPIB
115
0.610**
0.426**
0.073
0.591**
0.1
–
6
PPRB
115
0.516**
0.305**
0.072
0.442**
0.401**
1
–
7
PI
115
0.774**
0.815**
0.058
0.685**
0.698**
0.480**
1
–
8
WOND
115
0.666**
0.796**
0.086
0.722**
0.681**
0.506**
0.897**
1
–
9
ESV
115
0.576**
0.290**
0.080
0.331**
0.733**
0.341**
0.560**
0.433**
1
–
10
G-PIB
115
0.322**
0.250*
− 0.094
0.161
.341**
− 0.014
0.333**
0.332**
0.406**
1
–
11
G-IB
115
0.158
− 0.080
− 0.037
− 0.085
0.259**
− 0.163
0.065
0.012
0.318**
0.483**
1
12
G-RB
115
0.124
0.250*
0.044
0.345*
0.128
0.200*
0.259*
0.296*
0.047
0.021
− 0.223*
DPF Dysfunctional positive feelings, FPF Functional positive feelings, ASRM Altman self-rating scale for mania, PPIB Positive primary irrational beliefs, PPRB Positive primary rational beliefs, PI Positive intolerance, WOND Wonderfulizing, ESV Extreme self-valuing, G-PIB General positive irrational beliefs, G-IB General irrational beliefs, G-RB General rational beliefs
*p < 0.05 (2-tailed), **p < 0.01 (2-tailed)
Results showed that general rational beliefs as responses to aversive events (measured by ABS-SF) are significantly related to FPF (r = 0.25, p = 0.011) but not with DPF (p > 0.05). General irrational beliefs as responses to aversive events had a negative relationship with FPF; it did not reach significance (r = −0.08). However, when we partialled out DPF, the negative relationship between general irrational beliefs about adverse events and functional positive emotions became significant (r = −0.32, p = 0.001). No significant relationship was found between general irrational beliefs about adverse events and DPF. However, when we partialled out FPF, the positive relationship between general irrational beliefs about adverse events and dysfunctional positive emotions became significant (r = 0.32, p = 0.001).
When we analyzed the relationships between general positive irrational beliefs and DPF, relationships were significant (all ps < 0.05).
When we analyzed the relationship between specific positive irrational beliefs and functional and dysfunctional feelings, a different pattern emerged. All types of specific positive irrational beliefs were positively related to both functional and dysfunctional feelings (all ps < 0.05). Partialling out the DPF from the relationship between specific positive irrational beliefs and functional positive emotions resulted in non-significant correlations between situational positive demandingness, extreme self-valuing, and FPF (all ps > 0.05). Instead, in the case of wonderfulizing and positive intolerance their relationships with FPF were still significant after partialling out the effect of DPF (all ps < 0.05). We did not find any significant correlations between hypomania and measures of positive feelings and irrational beliefs (all ps > 0.05).
Mediation Analyses
We conducted parallel mediation analyses to assess the ABC model of positive emotional disturbance. The first assumption of the ABC model of positive feelings is that positive events will result in DPF when they activate positive primary irrational beliefs. We first tested whether the relationship between vividness of positive events (VIPE) and DPF is mediated by positive primary irrational beliefs (PPIB).
We tested a parallel mediation model that included both positive primary irrational beliefs (PPIB) and primary positive rational beliefs (PPRB) or preferences as mediators of the relationship between VIPE and DPF because the ABC model of emotion suggests that preferential evaluations will also act as mediators of both functional and dysfunctional feelings (DiLorenzo et al., 2007, 2011).
According to Hayes’ (2013) Macro Process via bootstrapping method, PPIB is a mediator of the relationship between VIPE and DPF when (1) the indirect effects of vividness of imaging positive events on DPF via mediators are significant (i.e., indirect effect = path a x path b; a = the effect of vividness of imagining positive events on the mediators, b = the effect of mediator on the DPF) and (2) the bias corrected 95% CI around the indirect effect from 5000 bootstrap re-samples excludes zero. The results showed that path a1 (i.e., the effect of VIPE on PPIB) (b = 0.635, p < 0.001) and path b1 (i.e., PPIB on DPF) (b = 3.833, p < 0.001) were both significant.
Similarly, the results showed that path a2 (i.e., the effect of VIPE on PPRB) (b = 0.498, p < 0.001) and path b2 (i.e., PPRB on DPF) (b = 3.815, p < 0.001) were both significant.
Results based on 5000 bootstrapped samples indicated the two mediators fully mediate the relationship between VIPE and DPF (IEoverall = 4.339, 95%, CI: LL = 2.952 to UL = 5.689). Specifically there was a significant indirect effect of impact of VIPE on DPF through PPIB (b = 2.436, 95% CI: LL = 1.314 to UL = 3.832), and through PPRB (b = 1.903, 95% CI: LL = 1.032 to UL = 2.785). Furthermore, the direct effect of VIPE on DPF was not significant (b = 0.293, t = 0.378, p = 0.705) when PPIBS and PPRB were entered in the equation, suggesting a total mediation (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1
Parallel mediation of the relationship between VIPE and DPF by PPIB and PPRB
×
The second assumption of the ABC model is that preferential evaluations mediate the effect of activating events on functional feelings, but no mediation effect will be observed for primary irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1994). To test this assumption, we ran a second parallel mediation analysis of both preferential positive evaluations and primary irrational beliefs on the relationship between positive events and FPF.
The results revealed a significant indirect effect of the impact of VIPE on FPF through positive preferences (b = 0.642, 95% CI: LL = 0.165 to UL = 1.209) but an insignificant indirect effect of PPIB on FPF (b = 0.412, 95% CI: LL = −0.053 to UL = 0.958). Furthermore, the direct effect of VIPE on FPF was still significant (b = 2.696, t = 4.746, p < 0.001) when mediators were entered in the equation, suggesting a partial mediation of FPF by preferences (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2
Parallel mediation of the relationship between VIPE and FPF by PPIB and PPRB
×
The third assumption of the ABC model of positive feelings is that the effect of PPIB on DPF will be mediated by positive secondary irrational beliefs. In a parallel mediation analysis, we assessed the mediating role of wonderfulizing, positive intolerance, and extreme self-valuing on the relationship between PPIB and DPF.
Results based on 5000 bootstrapped samples indicated there was a significant indirect effect of impact of PPIB on DPF through positive intolerance (b = 3.826, 95% CI: LL = 0. 370; to UL = 7.740), and excessive self-valuing (b = 1. 330, 95% CI: LL = 0.287 to UL = 2.471) but not through wonderfulizing (b = 0.061, 95% CI: LL = −3.337 to UL = 3.298). Furthermore, the direct effect of PPIB on DPF was no longer significant (b = 0.245, t = 0.282, p = 0.778) when mediators were entered in the equation. Hence, secondary irrational appraisals totally mediated the relationship between PPIB and DPF. The model did not support wonderfulizing as a mediator of PPIB on DPF, wonderfulizing acting more as an adaptive form of appraisal as was previously found for positive self-valuing (Tiba et al., 2023).
Exploratory Analyses
We investigated the relationships between FPF, DPF and hypomania. Positive feelings of any kind were not significantly linked to hypomania. This comes as a surprise because, according to the most recent hypothesis (Gruber, 2011), there should be a positive correlation between positive feelings and hypomania. It is possible that this outcome was caused by a floor effect. Because the reliability of the hypomania scale was low (0.61), these findings should be interpreted with caution. In a similar vein, we did not discover an association between hypomania and positive irrational beliefs. This result is consistent with earlier research, which found no link between positive irrational beliefs and hypomanic mood (Tiba et al., 2023).
When we analyzed the relationships between general positive irrational beliefs and positive feelings, the results showed that all types of general positive irrational beliefs significantly correlated with DPF (all ps < 0.05).
Discussion
This study tested the ABC model of positive feelings according to REBT theory (Ellis, 1994; Ellis & Dryden, 1997). First, we found that both positive primary irrational beliefs and preferences mediated the relationship between positive events and DPF. Second, we found that only situational positive rational beliefs mediated the effect of positive events on FPF. Third, we found that the effect of primary positive irrational beliefs on DPF was mediated by secondary positive appraisals in the form of positive intolerance and extreme self-valuing.
Our findings suggest that we can distinguish between two types of positive emotions: FPF and DPF. These results are in line with both theoretical proposals (David & Cramer, 2010; David & Avellino, 2003; Ellis, 1994) and empirical research supporting the binary model of distress (David et al., 2004, 2005; Opriș & Macavei, 2005). These findings expand the binary model of distress, suggesting a binary model of emotion for both positive and negative feelings. DPF are high intensity, high arousal positive affective feelings with phenomenological distinctiveness that are associated with positive irrational beliefs. FPF are low intensity, low-arousal positive feelings with phenomenological distinctiveness that are associated with positive rational beliefs. Second, our results suggest that individuals with higher levels of positive irrational beliefs have the tendency to respond with DPF to positive events.
The findings that positive rational and irrational beliefs mediate the relationship between positive events and DPF are in line with findings based on the ABC model of distress. For instance, DiLorenzo et al. (2011) found that both irrational and rational beliefs predicted dysfunctional negative feelings. Thus, our findings suggest that the cognitive model of Ellis may be applied to positive feelings as well. In both positive and negative contexts, primary irrational beliefs are correlated with DPF. Thus, our results are consistent with proposals that primary irrational beliefs (i.e., demandingness) may be implemented by an overdrive state of the approach motivational system (Tiba & Manea, 2018; Tiba & Szentagotai, 2005) in response to both cues of reward (positive events) and to the omission of rewards (adverse events). Further research should concomitantly measure the reactivity of approach motivational systems to verify this interpretation.
We also validated the second assumption of the ABC model of emotion, predicting that secondary appraisals mediate the effect of demandingness on dysfunctional feelings. Both positive intolerance and extreme self-valuing mediated the effect of demandingness on DPF. Yet we did not find a mediating role for wonderfulizing. Wonderfulzing did not correlate with general irrational beliefs and was positively (but not significantly) correlated with rational beliefs. This result suggests that wonderfulizing may reflect a positivity bias, with individuals who respond with rational appraisals to negative events also having a tendency to respond with wonderfulizing positive appraisals to positive events. Our findings align with those of a previous study (Tiba et al., 2023) that demonstrated a relationship between wonderfulizing and positive global self-evaluation with general rational beliefs, not with irrational beliefs about negative situations. It is possible that, similarly to global self-evaluation, a more extreme form of wonderfulizing may act as an irrational belief rather than an adaptive positive belief. Since the study was underpowered for these analyses, further research is needed for investigation and replication of this result before conclusions can be drawn.
Our results are in line with previous studies that support the REBT model of psychological health (Oltean et al., 2017, 2019). According to the REBT model of psychological health, individuals with higher levels of rational beliefs benefit from higher levels of well-being, positive emotions, happiness, and optimism (Szentagotai-Tătar et al., 2019). Instead, individuals with higher levels of irrational beliefs have lower levels of positive emotions (David et al., 2004).
Our results expand the REBT psychological health model by showing that we should consider two types of positive emotions (FPF and DPF) and two types of beliefs (rational/irrational) for well-being. Firstly, we found that both general rational beliefs about negative situations and rational beliefs in positive situations are positively related to FPF. Thus, promoting rational beliefs in both positive and negative situations may promote FPF and act as a protective factor for mental health (David et al., 2004). Secondly, we found that irrational beliefs are positively related to DPF. In other words, irrational beliefs may be detrimental to mental health and may promote DPF. We also found that general irrational beliefs about adverse situations result are related to reduced FPF, similar to previous results (David et al., 2004). For instance, David et al. (2004) found that individuals with high levels of irrational beliefs have low levels of functional positive emotions (i.e., confident, satisfied, happy, hopeful, content) when they experience unexplained arousal. Although our finding is consistent with results from previous studies, further research should investigate whether this relationship is a byproduct of rational beliefs, which may act as a confounder for the relationship between irrational beliefs and positive feelings. Further research should investigate the impact of DPF on mental health and psychopathology.
This study is not without limitations. First, the research uses self-reported data, and the results are vulnerable to self-reporting bias. Second, most participants were female (88%), so the generalizability to the male population is limited. Third, we tested the assessment of emotions individuals endorse if the situation happens, thus, our measures of emotions are based on a subjective report of more foreseen emotions than experienced emotions. Fourth, the limited sample size indicates the need for additional studies to confirm the findings. Further studies should focus on using different measures of experienced feelings.
There are several implications for practice. Dysfunctional and intense positive emotions have significant negative consequences on mental health (Gruber et al., 2019). According to our results, psychological interventions may reduce dysfunctional positive emotions and promote functional positive emotions by focusing on (1) changing irrational beliefs and promoting rational beliefs in response to adverse events to increase the level of FPF, and (2) changing positive irrational beliefs in response to positive events to reduce DPF.
Declarations
Conflict of interest
The authors declare no competing interests.
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